The NBA Is Worth $199 Billion, 14.6 Times Revenue. The New $76 Billion Media Deal Is in the Price Before It Is in the Revenue.

Sportico’s 2026-27 NBA valuations, reported by ClutchPoints on 9 October 2026, put the Golden State Warriors first at $14.5 billion, up 28% from $11.3 billion a year earlier, and the league’s 30 franchises together at $199 billion. Estimated 2025-26 league revenue was $13.7 billion, and the average valuation multiple was 14.6 times revenue, up 13.5% from 2025 and the highest among the major North American leagues. Those are estimates produced by a business publication, not prices paid. They are still a useful set of numbers, because they show how much of an NBA franchise’s value is a bet on what comes next.

The numbers, with their source

All figures below come from ClutchPoints’ report of Sportico’s list, because Sportico’s own pages were not accessible to us. After the Warriors, the Knicks are at $12.8 billion and the Lakers at $12.5 billion; the next tier runs from the Clippers at $8.21 billion down through the Bulls ($8.13 billion), Heat ($8.05 billion), Celtics ($8 billion), Nets ($7.45 billion), 76ers ($7.15 billion) and Rockets ($6.92 billion). The Memphis Grizzlies are 30th at $4.2 billion. League revenue of $13.7 billion works out to about $456 million per club, second among the major leagues behind the NFL’s $733 million. The Warriors’ average revenue is reported at $895 million, net of revenue sharing, about 26% above the Knicks. Multiples elsewhere: NFL 12.7, NHL 9.4, MLS 9.2 and MLB 7.2, per the same report.

What 14.6 times revenue means

The multiple is value divided by revenue. Dividing the league total of $199 billion by $13.7 billion gives 14.5 times, close to the reported 14.6. The small gap is likely method: an average of 30 individual team multiples is not the same as the league total divided by league revenue, because teams with high multiples and teams with low multiples weigh differently in the two calculations. The Warriors offer one illustration. $14.5 billion over their reported $895 million of revenue is about 16.2 times, above the league average.

A 13.5% rise in the multiple has a precise meaning. By definition, valuations grew 13.5% faster than revenues over the year. If revenue grew by 5%, for example, valuations would have grown by about 19%, since 1.05 times 1.135 is about 1.19. That example is hypothetical; the source does not give a 2025 league total or revenue growth. The principle is that a rising multiple means buyers are paying more for each dollar of revenue, which is another way of saying they expect future revenue or margins to be higher than today’s.

The media-deal timing gap

What do buyers expect? The report points to the NBA’s new media deal, which it describes as 11 years and $76 billion, and to expansion talks involving Las Vegas and Seattle that are growing, along with a local media hub the league is developing. Divided evenly, $76 billion over 11 years is about $6.9 billion a year, or around half of the $13.7 billion of estimated 2025-26 league revenue. For context, and this is background rather than from the source, the league’s previous national deal, signed in 2014, was widely reported at $24 billion over nine years, or about $2.7 billion a year, so the new average annual payment is roughly two and a half times as large. The sources we read do not give the year-by-year payment schedule, so we cannot say how much of that step-up is already in the $13.7 billion and how much is still to come. If payments rise over the contract, valuations that look at future cash flows would run ahead of reported revenue, which is the thesis behind the headline. It is a reasonable inference, not something the report proves.

Franchise scarcity is the second ingredient. Thirty teams exist, and expansion, if it comes, would add two. When supply is fixed and wealthy buyers want to own a global sports property, price can rise for reasons separate from cash flow. The Warriors illustrate how far the arithmetic can run: Joe Lacob’s group bought them in July 2010 for about $450 million, a record price at the time, and the $14.5 billion estimate is more than 3,100% higher, an increase of $14.05 billion, according to the report.

Estimates versus transactions

The distinction between a published valuation and a transaction matters. Sportico’s numbers are estimates built from revenue, profit, arena and market considerations and recent sales. A sale is a price a buyer paid with a specific set of rights, debts and minority discounts or control premiums. The report says the Lakers sold for $10 billion in 2025 and were sold again this summer at a price it gives as $12.5 billion in the text but $12 billion in the linked headline; ClutchPoints is internally inconsistent on this, so we cannot state the figure firmly. If $12.5 billion is right, that is a 25% rise in a year, a bit less than the Warriors’ 28% estimated rise. If $12 billion is right, it is 20%. Either way the transaction and the estimate point in the same direction, which gives the estimates some support, though only two data points. Our earlier coverage of the Lakers sale describes the deal terms in detail and we do not repeat them here.

The sceptic’s case

The sceptical view is that valuations are prices set by marginal buyers, and they rise when capital is abundant and scarce assets are few. A 14.6 multiple does not say the league can earn a return on that price from operations; it says someone is willing to pay it. The report does not give operating income, so a reader cannot tell what the teams earn on the capital that valuation represents. Revenue also differs from profit: a team with $895 million of revenue net of revenue sharing may still be investing heavily in arenas, players and luxury-tax payments. The counter-case is that long-dated media contracts, a limited number of teams and global growth justify paying for future cash flows that current revenue does not yet show, and that previous high multiples were followed by still higher prices. Both views fit the evidence available.

What would make multiples fall

• Media revenue that grows more slowly than the contract headline suggests, for example if viewership falls short of what rights holders paid for.
• Higher interest rates, which reduce what buyers will pay for long-dated cash flows. The 10-year Treasury yield was reported at 5.26% on 9 October.
• Expansion that adds supply faster than demand, or a new league-wide labour or luxury-tax regime that cuts margins.
• A weak sale. A single transaction well below the estimates would be a more powerful signal than an annual list.
• Evidence that revenue sharing moves more money from large to small markets than the valuation methodology assumes.

What the evidence does not establish

We have seen only a secondary report of Sportico’s figures, and the Lakers sale price in it is internally inconsistent. Operating income by team is not reported, so we cannot test whether valuations are supported by profit. We do not have the media deal’s payment schedule, so the claim that valuations are ahead of revenue is an inference from the multiple and the contract, not a finding. The 2014-deal comparison is background from outside the source. This analysis is current as of 11 October 2026.